Posts Tagged 'Election polling'

Why the Media Cried (Red) Wolf

Journalists are puzzled as to why a predicted “red wave” (a Republican resurgence) did not materialize in the 2022 midterm elections. The signals that the red wave would fail to form were clear. The failure of journalists to foresee the success of Democratic candidates was caused by their inability to discern the good polls from the bad.

Established, media- and college-branded polls performed historically well in this cycle. They provided all the data necessary to foresee that a red wave would not emerge.

So why was there such a widespread view that the Republicans would have a big night?

The answer is that journalists have become indiscriminate in their polling coverage. Conservative-leaning pollsters released a flood of poor-quality polls in the last two weeks before the election. These polls pointed to a brewing red tsunami, and the media covered them with little, if any, due diligence.

I have had conversations with long-time pollsters who, through rolled eyes, tell me they think some of these pollsters are simply making up their numbers. In this cycle, pollsters obtained cross-tabulations from a Trafalgar poll that indicated that almost two-thirds of Gen Z Voters would vote for a MAGA candidate in Georgia (when one-third would have represented a historic swing). Yet, respected journalists widely reported the results of this very same poll.

Trafalgar’s 2022 polls were demonstrably inaccurate. Trafalgar released 19 statewide polls in the week preceding the election. These polls chose the correct winner in just 11 of these polls. Just seven were within their margin of error, and Trafalgar’s mean polling error is likely to end up being more than double the mean polling error of “name-brand” pollsters.

It is understandable that right-leaning media are interested in these polls, as they provide a hopeful, confirmatory message their audience wants to hear. Since reputable polls have erred in a liberal direction in the past few cycles, there is a sense that we cannot trust them anymore.

Journalists ignored that polls have always fluctuated between missing in a liberal or conservative direction. Because polls have been off in a liberal direction in the past two presidential elections, journalists have assumed a liberal bias is here to stay. In 2022, this proved to be incorrect.

It isn’t just the media that provide oxygen to these polls. Poll aggregators (particularly RealClearPolitics) had a horrible cycle because they were indiscriminate in which polls were included in their averages. Predictive modelers (such as FiveThirtyEight) had a solid night that could have been tremendous if they could get out of a mentality that every poll has something of value to contribute to their models.

Reporting on polls with suspect methods is simply bad journalism. Trusted journalists would never release a story without considerable fact-checking of their sources. Yet, they continue to cover polls that are not transparent, have poor track records, have no defensible methodology, and are shunned by the polling establishment.  

This is journalistic malpractice, and the result can be dire. When the election results do not match expectations set by the polls, an environment is fostered where election denialism thrives. January 6th happened partly because the partisan polls the protesters focused on had Donald Trump winning the election, and good journalists fueled this mentality by reporting on these polls. They provided these polls with a legitimacy they did not deserve.

Statistical laws imply that we cannot know in advance which polls will be correct in any given election. But we know which ones meet industry standards for methodology and disclosure and that, in the long term, have been proven to get it right far more often than they get it wrong.

It is no secret that pollsters face technological headwinds, but their occasional misses are not for lack of trying. After each election, pollsters convene, share findings, and discuss how to improve polls for the next election. In this sense, polling is one of the most honest professions.

Do you know who is missing from these conversations and not contributing to this honesty? The conservative-leaning pollsters.

My advice to journalists is this: stick to credible polls and stop giving every poll a voice. Rely more on the pollsters themselves for editorial decisions on what goes in the polls and the interpretations of their results. Stop creating the news by being too involved in the content of polls and return to doing what you do best: report on poll findings and provide context.

Above all, fact-check the polls like you would any other source.

Polling’s Winners and Losers from the Midterms

The pollsters did well last night.

Right now (the morning after the election), it is hard to know if 2022 will go down as a watershed moment when pollsters once again found their footing or if it will merely be a stay of execution. The 2018 midterms were also quite good for pollsters, yet the 2020 election was not.

To be clear, there are still many votes to count, so it is unfair to judge the polls too quickly. In POLL-ARIZED, I criticize media members who do. Nonetheless, below is a list of what I see as some winners and losers and some that seem like they are in the middle.

The Winners

  • Pre-election polling in general. For the most part, the polls did a good job of pointing out the close races, and exit polls suggest that they did an excellent job of highlighting the issues that concern voters most. I suspect the polling error rate will be far below the historical average of five+ points for midterm elections.
  • The “good” pollsters. The better-known polling brands, especially those with media partnerships, and some college polling centers had good results.
  • John King’s brain. Say what you want about CNN, but watching someone who knows the name of every county in America, the candidates in every election district, and the results of past elections perform without a net and stick the landing is impressive.
  • The CNN magic wall. I know other networks have them, but I can’t be the only data geek who marvels at the database systems and APIs behind CNN’s screen. It must have cost millions and involved dozens of people.
  • The Iowa Poll’s response rate. Their methodology statement says they contacted 1,118 Iowa residents for a final sample size of 801, with a response rate of 72%. This reminds me of the good old days. I would like to see pollsters spend more time benchmarking what Selzer & Co. are doing right with this poll.

The Losers

  • The partisan pollsters, particularly Trafalgar. These pollsters were way off this cycle. They have been way off in most cycles. I hope that non-partisan media outlets will stop covering them. They provide a story that outlets and viewers seeking a confirmation bias enjoy, but objective media should leave them behind for good.
  • The media who failed to see that there were so many less-reputable conservative polls released over the past two weeks. Most media were hoodwinked by this and ran a narrative that a red storm was brewing.
  • Response rates. I delved into the methodology of many final polls this cycle; most had net response rates of less than 2%. That is about half what response rates were just two years ago. The fact that the pollsters did so well with this low response is a testament to the brilliance of methodologists, but the data they have to work with is getting worse each cycle. They will not be able to keep pulling rabbits out of their hat.
  • The prediction markets. I have long hoped that the betting markets can emerge to provide a plausible alternative to polls regarding predicting elections so that the polls can focus on issues and not the horse races. These markets did not have a good night.
  • FiveThirtyEight’s pollster ratings. It is too early to make a definitive statement, but some of their highly rated pollsters had poor results, while many with middling grades did well. These ratings are helpful when they are accurate and have a defensible method behind them. When these gradings are inaccurate, they ruin reputations and businesses, so FiveThirtyEight must embrace that producing objective and accurate ratings is a serious responsibility.

The “So-So”

  • The Iowa Poll. Even with the high response, this poll seemed to overstate the Republican vote this time. They did get all the winners correct. This poll has a strong history of success, so it might be fair to chalk the slight miss up to normal sampling fluctuation. It isn’t statistically possible to get it right every single time. I must admit I have a bias of rooting for this poll.
  • The modelers, such as FiveThirtyEight and the Economist. On the hand, the concept of a probabilistic forecast is spot on. On the other, it is not particularly informative in coin-toss races. In this cycle, the forecasts they made for Senate and House seats weren’t much different than what could have been made by just tossing a coin in the contested races. Their median predictions for House and Senate seats overstated where the Republicans will end up, possibly because they also fell prey to the release of so many conservative-leaning polls in the campaign’s final stages.
  • Polling error direction. In the past few cycles, the polling error has been in the direction of overcounting Democrats. In 2022, this error seemed to move in the other direction. Historically, these errors have been uncorrelated from election to election, so I must admit that I’ve probably jumped the gun by suggesting in POLL-ARIZED the pro-Democrat error direction was structural and here to stay.
  • The media’s coverage of the polls on election day. In 2016 and 2020, the press reveled in bashing the pollsters. This time, they hardly talked about them at all. That seemed a bit unfair – if pollsters are going to be criticized when they do poorly, they should be celebrated when they do well.

All-in-all, a good night for the pollsters. But, I don’t want to rush to a conclusion that the polls are now fixed because, in reality, the pollsters didn’t change much in their methods from 2020. I hope the industry will study what went right, as we tend to re-examine our methods when they fail, not when they succeed.

Pre-Election Polling and Baseball Share a Lot in Common

The goal of a pre-election poll is to predict which candidate will win an election and by how much. Pollsters work towards this goal by 1) obtaining a representative sample of respondents, 2) determining which candidate a respondent will vote for, and 3) predicting the chances each respondent will take the time to vote.

All three of these steps involve error. It is the first one, obtaining a representative sample of respondents, which has changed the most in the past decade or so.

It is the third characteristic that separates pre-election polling from other forms of polling and survey research. Statisticians must predict how likely each person they interview will be to vote. This is called their “Likely Voter Model.”

As I state in POLL-ARIZED, this is perhaps the most subjective part of the polling process. The biggest irony in polling is that it becomes an art when we hand the data to the scientists (methodologists) to apply a Likely Voter Model.

It is challenging to understand what pollsters do in their Likely Voter Models and perhaps even more challenging to explain.  

An example from baseball might provide a sense of what pollsters are trying to do with these models.

Suppose Mike Trout (arguably the most underappreciated sports megastar in history) is stepping up to the plate. Your job is to predict Trout’s chances of getting a hit. What is your best guess?

You could take a random guess between 0 and 100%. But, since that would give you a 1% chance of being correct, there must be a better way.

A helpful approach comes from a subset of statistical theory called Bayesian statistics. This theory says we can start with a baseline of Trout’s hit probability based on past data.

For instance, we might see that so far this year, the overall major league batting average is .242. So, we might guess that Trout’s probability of getting a hit is 24%.

This is better than a random guess. But, we can do better, as Mike Trout is no ordinary hitter.

We might notice there is even better information out there. Year-to-date, Trout is batting .291. So, our guess for his chances might be 29%. Even better.

Or, we might see that Trout’s lifetime average is .301 and that he hit .333 last year. Since we believe in a concept called regression to the mean, that would lead us to think that his batting average should be better for the rest of the season than it is currently. So, we revise our estimate upward to 31%.

There is still more information we can use. The opposing pitcher is Justin Verlander. Verlander is a rare pitcher who has owned Trout in the past – Trout’s average is just .116 against Verlander. This causes us to revise our estimate downward a bit. Perhaps we take it to about 25%.

We can find even more information. The bases are loaded. Trout is a clutch hitter, and his career average with men on base is about 10 points higher than when the bases are empty. So, we move our estimate back up to about 28%.

But it is August. Trout has a history of batting well early in and late in the season, but he tends to cool off during the dog days of summer. So, we decide to end this and settle on a probability of 25%.

This sort of analysis could go on forever. Every bit of information we gather about Trout can conceivably help make a better prediction for his chances. Is it raining? What is the score? What did he have for breakfast? Is he in his home ballpark? Did he shave this morning? How has Verlander pitched so far in this game? What is his pitch count?

There are pre-election polling analogies in this baseball example, particularly if you follow the probabilistic election models created by organizations like FiveThirtyEight and The Economist.

Just as we might use Trout’s lifetime average as our “prior” probability, these models will start with macro variables for their election predictions. They will look at the past implications of things like incumbency, approval ratings, past turnout, and economic indicators like inflation, unemployment, etc. In theory, these can adjust our assumptions of who will win the election before we even include polling data.

Of course, using Trout’s lifetime average or these macro variables in polling will only be helpful to the extent that the future behaves like the past. And therein lies the rub – overreliance on past experience makes these models inaccurate during dynamic times.

Part of why pollsters missed badly in 2020 is unique things were going on – a global pandemic, changed methods of voting, increased turnout, etc. In baseball, perhaps this is a year with a juiced baseball, or Trout is dealing with an injury.

The point is that while unprecedented things are unpredictable, they happen with predictable regularity. There is always something unique about an election cycle or a Mike Trout at bat.

The most common question I am getting from readers of POLL-ARIZED is, “will the pollsters get it right in 2024?” My answer is that since pollsters are applying past assumptions in their model, they will get it right to the extent that the world in 2024 looks like the world did in 2020, and I would not put my own money on it.

I make a point in POLL-ARIZED that pollsters’ models have become too complex. While in theory, the predictive value of a model never gets worse when you add in more variables, in practice, this has made these models uninterpretable. Pollsters include so many variables in their likely voter models that many of their adjustments cancel each other out. They are left with a model with no discernable underlying theory.

If you look closely, we started with a probability of 24% for Trout. Even after looking at a lot of other information and making reasonable adjustments, we still ended up with a prediction of 25%. The election models are the same way. They include so many variables that they can cancel out each other’s effects and end up with a prediction that looks much like the raw data did before the methodologists applied their wizardry.

This effort is better spent at getting better input for the models by investing in generating the trust needed to increase the response rates we get to our surveys and polls. Improving the quality of our data input will increase the predictive quality of the polls more than coming up with more complicated ways to weight the data.

Of course, in the end, one candidate wins, and the other loses, and Mike Trout either gets a hit, or he doesn’t, so the actual probability moves to 0% or 100%. Trout cannot get 25% of a hit, and a candidate cannot win 79% of an election.

As I write this, I looked up the last time Trout faced Verlander. It turns out Verlander struck him out!

Things That Surprised Me When Writing a Book

I recently published a book outlining the challenges election pollsters face and the implications of those challenges for survey researchers.

This book was improbable. I am not an author nor a pollster, yet I wrote a book on polling. It is a result of a curiosity that got away from me.

Because I am a new author, I thought it might be interesting to list unexpected things that happened along the way. I had a lot of surprises:

  • How quickly I wrote the first draft. Many authors toil for years on a manuscript. The bulk of POLL-ARIZED was composed in about three weeks, working a couple of hours daily. The book covers topics central to my career, and it was a matter of getting my thoughts typed and organized. I completed the entire first draft before telling my wife I had started it.
  • How long it took to turn that first draft into a final draft. After I had all my thoughts organized, I felt a need to review everything I could find on the topic. I read about 20 books on polling and dozens of academic papers, listened to many hours of podcasts, interviewed polling experts, and spent weeks researching online. I convinced a few fellow researchers to read the draft and incorporated their feedback. The result was a refinement of my initial draft and arguments and the inclusion of other material. This took almost a year!
  • How long it took to get the book from a final draft until it was published. I thought I was done at this point. Instead, it took another five months to get it in shape to publish – to select a title, get it edited, commission cover art, set it up on Amazon and other outlets, etc. I used Scribe Media, which was expensive, but this process would have taken me a year or more if I had done it without them.
  • That going for a long walk is the most productive writing tactic ever. Every good idea in the book came to me when I trekked in nature. Little of value came to me when sitting in front of a computer. I would go for long hikes, work out arguments in my head, and brew a strong cup of coffee. For some reason, ideas flowed from my caffeinated state of mind.
  • That writing a book is not a way to make money. I suspected this going in, but it became clear early on that this would be a money-losing project. POLL-ARIZED has exceeded my sales expectations, but it cost more to publish than it will ever make back in royalties. I suspect publishing this book will pay back in our research work, as it establishes credibility for us and may lead to some projects.
  • Marketing a book is as challenging as writing one. I guide large organizations on their marketing strategy, yet I found I didn’t have the first clue about how to promote this book. I would estimate that the top 10% of non-fiction books make up 90% of the sales, and the other 90% of books are fighting for the remaining 10%.
  • Because the commission on a book is a few dollars per copy, it proved challenging to find marketing tactics that pay back. For instance, I thought about doing sponsored ads on LinkedIn. It turns out that the per-click charge for those ads was more than the book’s list price. The best money I spent to promote the book was sponsored Amazon searches. But even those failed to break even.
  • Deciding to keep the book at a low price proved wise. So many people told me I was nuts to hold the eBook at 99 cents for so long or keep the paperback affordable. I did this because it was more important to me to get as many people to read it as possible than to generate revenue. Plus, a few college professors have been interested in adopting the book for their survey research courses. I have been studying the impact of book prices on college students for about 20 years, and I thought it was right not to contribute to the problem.
  • BookBub is incredible if you are lucky enough to be selected. BookBub is a community of voracious readers. I highly recommend joining if you read a lot. Once a week, they email their community about new releases they have vetted and like. They curate a handful of titles out of thousands of submissions. I was fortunate that my book got selected. Some authors angle for a BookBub deal for years and never get chosen. The sales volume for POLL-ARIZED went up by a factor of 10 in one day after the promotion ran.
  • Most conferences and some podcasts are “pay to play.” Not all of them, but many conferences and podcasts will not support you unless you agree to a sponsorship deal. When you see a research supplier speaking at an event or hear them on a podcast, they may have paid the hosts something for the privilege. This bothers me. I understand why they do this, as they need financial support. Yet, I find it disingenuous that they do not disclose this – it is on the edge of being unethical. It harms their product. If a guest has to pay to give a conference presentation or talk on a podcast, it pressures them to promote their business rather than have an honest discussion of the issues. I will never view these events or podcasts the same. (If you see me at an event or hear me on a podcast, be assured that I did not pay anything to do so.)
  • That the industry associations didn’t want to give the book attention. If you have read POLL-ARIZED, you will know that it is critical (I believe appropriately and constructively) of the polling and survey research fields. The three most important associations rejected my proposals to present and discuss the book at their events. This floored me, as I cannot think of any topics more essential to this industry’s future than those I raise in the book. Even insights professionals who have read the book and disagree with my arguments have told me that I am bringing up points that merit discussion. This cold shoulder from the associations made me feel better about writing that “this is an industry that doesn’t seem poised to fix itself.”
  • That clients have loved the book. The most heartwarming part of the process is that it has reconnected me with former colleagues and clients from a long research career. Everyone I have spoken to who is on the client-side of the survey research field has appreciated the book. Many clients have bought it for their entire staff. I have had client-side research directors I have never worked with tell me they loved the book.
  • That some of my fellow suppliers want to kill me. The book lays our industry bare, and not everyone is happy about that. I had a competitor ask me, ” Why are you telling clients to ask us what our response rates are?” I stand behind that!
  • How much I learned along the way. There is something about getting your thoughts on paper that creates a lot of learning. There is a saying that the best way to learn a subject is to teach it. I would add that trying to write a book about something can teach you what you don’t know. That was a thrill for me. But then again, I was the type of person who would attend lectures for classes I wasn’t even taking while in college. I started writing this book to educate myself, and it has been a great success in that sense.
  • How tough it was for me to decide to publish it. There was not a single point in the process when I did not consider not publishing this book. I found I wanted to write it a lot more than publish it. I suffered from typical author fears that it wouldn’t be good enough, that my peers would find my arguments weak, or that it would bring unwanted attention to me rather than the issues the book presents. I don’t regret publishing it, but it would never have happened without encouragement from the few people who read it in advance.
  • The respect I gained for non-fiction authors. I have always been a big reader. I now realize how much work goes into this process, with no guarantee of success. I have always told people that long-form journalism is the profession I respect the most. Add “non-fiction” writers to that now!

Almost everyone who has contacted me about the book has asked me if I will write another one. If I do, it will likely be on a different topic. If I learned anything, this process requires selecting an issue you care about passionately. Journalists are people who can write good books about almost anything. The rest of us mortals must choose a topic we are super interested in, or our books will be awful.

I’ve got a few dancing around in my head, so who knows, maybe you’ll see another book in the future.

For now, it is time to get back to concentrating on our research business!

CRUX POLL SHOWS THAT JUST 17% OF AMERICANS TRUST POLLSTERS

ROCHESTER, NY – OCTOBER 20, 2021 – Polling results released today by Crux Research indicate that just 17% of U.S. adults have “very high trust” or “high trust” in pollsters/polling organizations.

Just 21% of U.S. adults felt that polling organizations did an “excellent” or “good” job in predicting the 2020 U.S. Presidential election. 40% of adults who were polled in the 2020 election felt the poll they responded to was biased.

Trust in pollsters is higher among Democrats than it is among Republicans and Independents. Pollster trust is highest among adults under 30 years old and lowest among those over 50. This variability can contribute to the challenges pollsters face, as cooperation with polls may also vary among these groups.

It has been a difficult stretch of time for pollsters. 51% of Americans feel that Presidential election polls are getting less accurate over time. And, just 12% are confident that polling organizations will correctly predict the next President in 2024.

The poll results show that there are trusted institutions and professions in America. Nurses are the most trusted profession, followed by medical doctors and pharmacists. Telemarketers, car salespersons, social media companies, Members of Congress, and advertising agencies are the least trusted professions.

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Methodology

This poll was conducted online between October 6 and October 17, 2021. The sample size was 1,198 U.S. adults (aged 18 and over). Quota sampling and weighting were employed to ensure that respondent proportions for age group, sex, race/ethnicity, education, and region matched their actual proportions in the population.   

This poll did not have a sponsor and was conducted and funded by Crux Research, an independent market research firm that is not in any way associated with political parties, candidates, or the media.

All surveys and polls are subject to many sources of error. The term “margin of error” is misleading for online polls, which are not based on a probability sample which is a requirement for margin of error calculations. If this study did use probability sampling, the margin of error would be +/-3%.

About Crux Research Inc.

Crux Research partners with clients to develop winning products and services, build powerful brands, create engaging marketing strategies, enhance customer satisfaction and loyalty, improve products and services, and get the most out of their advertising.

Using quantitative and qualitative methods, Crux connects organizations with their customers in a wide range of industries, including health care, education, consumer goods, financial services, media and advertising, automotive, technology, retail, business-to-business, and non-profits.

Crux connects decision makers with customers, uses data to inspire new thinking, and assures clients they are being served by experienced, senior level researchers who set the standard for customer service from a survey research and polling consultant. To learn more about Crux Research, visit www.cruxresearch.com.

Oops, the polls did it again

Many people had trouble sleeping last night wondering if their candidate was going to be President. I couldn’t sleep because as the night wore on it was becoming clear that this wasn’t going to be a good night for the polls.

Four years ago on the day after the election I wrote about the “epic fail” of the 2016 polls. I couldn’t sleep last night because I realized I was going to have to write another post about another polling failure. While the final vote totals may not be in for some time, it is clear that the 2020 polls are going to be off on the national vote even more than the 2016 polls were.

Yesterday, on election day I received an email from a fellow market researcher and business owner. We are involved in a project together and he was lamenting how poor the data quality has been in his studies recently and was wondering if we were having the same problems.

In 2014 we wrote a blog post that cautioned our clients that we were detecting poor quality interviews that needed to be discarded about 10% of the time. We were having to throw away about 1 in 10 of the interviews we collected.

Six years later that percentage has moved to be between 33% and 45% and we tend to be conservative in the interviews we toss. It is fair to say that for most market research studies today, between a third and a half of the interviews being collected are, for a lack of a better term, junk.  

It has gotten so bad that new firms have sprung up that serve as a go-between from sample providers and online questionnaires in order to protect against junk interviews. They protect against bots, survey farms, duplicate interviews, etc. Just the fact that these firms and terms like “survey farms” exist should give researchers pause regarding data quality.

When I started in market research in the late 80s/early 90’s we had a spreadsheet program that was used to help us cost out projects. One parameter in this spreadsheet was “refusal rate” – the percent of respondents who would outright refuse to take part in a study. While the refusal rate varied by study, the beginning assumption in this program was 40%, meaning that on average we expected 60% of the time respondents would cooperate. 

According to Pew and AAPOR in 2018 the cooperation rate for telephone surveys was 6% and falling rapidly.

Cooperation rates in online surveys are much harder to calculate in a standardized way, but most estimates I have seen and my own experience suggest that typical cooperation rates are about 5%. That means for a 1,000-respondent study, at least 20,000 emails are sent, which is about four times the population of the town I live in.

This is all background to try to explain why the 2020 polls appear to be headed to a historic failure. Election polls are the public face of the market research industry. Relative to most research projects, they are very simple. The problems pollsters have faced in the last few cycles is emblematic of something those working in research know but rarely like to discuss: the quality of data collected for research and polls has been declining, and should be alarming to researchers.

I could go on about the causes of this. We’ve tortured our respondents for a long time. Despite claims to the contrary, we haven’t been able to generate anything close to a probability sample in years. Our methodologists have gotten cocky and feel like they can weight any sampling anomalies away. Clients are forcing us to conduct projects on timelines that make it impossible to guard against poor quality data. We focus on sampling error and ignore more consequential errors. The panels we use have become inbred and gather the same respondents across sources. Suppliers are happy to cash the check and move on to the next project.

This is the research conundrum of our times: in a world where we collect more data on people’s behavior and attitudes than ever before, the quality of the insights we glean from these data is in decline.

Post 2016 the polling industry brain trust rationalized and claimed that the polls actually did a good job, convened some conferences to discuss the polls, and made modest methodological changes. Almost all of these changes related to sampling and weighting. But, as it appears that the 2020 polling miss is going to be way beyond what can be explained by sampling (last night I remarked to my wife that “I bet the p-value of this being due to sampling is about 1 in 1,000”), I feel that pollsters have addressed the wrong problem.

None of the changes pollsters made addressed the long-term problems researchers face with data quality. When you have a response rate of 5% and up to half of those are interviews you need to throw away, errors that can arise are orders of magnitude greater than the errors that are generated by sampling and weighting mistakes.

I don’t want to sound like I have the answers.  Just a few days ago I posted that I thought that on balance there were more reasons to conclude that the polls would do a good job this time than to conclude that they would fail. When I look through my list of potential reasons the polls might fail, nothing leaps to me as an obvious cause, so perhaps the problem is multi-faceted.

What I do know is the market research industry has not done enough to address data quality issues. And every four years the polls seem to bring that into full view.

Will the polls be right this time?

The 2016 election was damaging to the market research industry. The popular perception has been that in 2016 the pollsters missed the mark and miscalled the winner. In reality, the 2016 polls were largely predictive of the national popular vote. But, 2016 was largely seen by non-researchers as disastrous. Pollsters and market researchers have a lot riding on the perceived accuracy of 2020 polls.

The 2016 polls did a good job of predicting the national vote total but in a large majority of cases final national polls were off in the direction of overpredicting the vote for Clinton and underpredicting the vote for Trump. That is pretty much a textbook definition of bias. Before the books are closed on the 2016 pollster’s performance, it is important to note that the 2012 polls were off even further and mostly in the direction of overpredicting the vote for Romney and underpredicting the vote for Obama. The “bias,” although small, has swung back and forth between parties.

Election Day 2020 is in a few days and we may not know the final results for a while. It won’t be possible to truly know how the polls did for some weeks or months.

That said, there are reasons to believe that the 2020 polls will do an excellent job of predicting voter behavior and there are reasons to believe they may miss the mark.  

There are specific reasons why it is reasonable to expect that the 2020 polls will be accurate. So, what is different in 2020? 

  • There have been fewer undecided voters at all stages of the process. Most voters have had their minds made up well in advance of election Tuesday. This makes things simpler from a pollster’s perspective. A polarized and engaged electorate is one whose behavior is predictable. Figuring out how to partition undecided voters moves polling more in a direction of “art” than “science.”
  • Perhaps because of this, polls have been remarkably stable for months. In 2016, there was movement in the polls throughout and particularly over the last two weeks of the campaign. This time, the polls look about like they did weeks and even months ago.
  • Turnout will be very high. The art in polling is in predicting who will turn out and a high turnout election is much easier to forecast than a low turnout election.
  • There has been considerable early voting. There is always less error in asking about what someone has recently done than what they intend to do in the future. Later polls could ask many respondents how they voted instead of how they intended to vote.
  • There have been more polls this time. As our sample size of polls increases so does the accuracy. Of course, there are also more bad polls out there this cycle as well.
  • There have been more and better polls in the swing states this time. The true problem pollsters had in 2016 was with state-level polls. There was less attention paid to them, and because the national pollsters and media didn’t invest much in them, the state-level polling is where it all went wrong. This time, there has been more investment in swing-state polling.
  • The media invested more in polls this time. A hidden secret in polling is that election polls rarely make money for the pollster. This keeps many excellent research organizations from getting involved in them or dedicating resources to them. The ones that do tend to do so solely for reputational reasons. An increased investment this time has helped to get more researchers involved in election polling.
  • Response rates are upslightly. 2020 is the first year where we have seen a long-term trend towards declining response rates on survey stabilize and even kick up a little. This is likely a minor factor in the success of the 2020 polls, but it is in the right direction.
  • The race isn’t as close as it was in 2016. This one might only be appreciated by statisticians. Since variability is maximized in a 50/50 distribution the further away from an even race it is the more accurate a poll will be. This is another small factor in the direction of the polls being accurate in 2020.
  • There has not been late breaking news that could influence voter behavior. In 2016, the FBI director’s decision to announce a probe into Clinton’s emails came late in the campaign. There haven’t been any similar bombshells this time.
  • Pollsters started setting quotas and weighting on education. In the past, pollsters would balance samples on characteristics known to correlate highly with voting behavior – characteristics like age, gender, political party affiliation, race/ethnicity, and past voting behavior. In 2016, pollsters learned the hard way that educational attainment had become an additional characteristic to consider when crafting samples because voter preferences vary by education level. The good polls fixed that this go round.
  • In a similar vein, there has been a tighter scrutiny of polling methodology. While the media can still be a cavalier about digging into methodology, this time they were more likely to insist that pollsters outline their methods. This is the first time I can remember seeing news stories where pollsters were asked questions about methodology.
  • The notion that there are Trump supporters who intentionally lie to pollsters has largely been disproven by studies from very credible sources, such as Yale and Pew. Much more relevant is the pollster’s ability to predict turnout from both sides.

There are a few things going on that give the polls some potential to lay an egg.

  • The election will be decided by a small number of swing states. Swing state polls are not as accurate and are often funded by local media and universities that don’t have the funding or the expertise to do them correctly. The polls are close and less stable in these states. There is some indication that swing state polls have been tightening, and Biden’s lead in many of them isn’t much different than Clinton’s lead in 2020.
  • Biden may be making the same mistake Clinton made. This is a political and not a research-related reason, but in 2016 Clinton failed to aggressively campaign in the key states late in the campaign while Trump went all in. History could be repeating itself. Field work for final polls is largely over now, so the polls will not reflect things that happen the last few days.
  • If there is a wild-card that will affect polling accuracy in 2020, it is likely to center around how people are voting. Pollsters have been predicting election day voting for decades. In this cycle votes have been coming in for weeks and the methods and rules around early voting vary widely by state. Pollsters just don’t have past experience with early voting.
  • There is really no way for pollsters to account for potential disqualifications for mail-in votes (improper signatures, late receipts, legal challenges, etc.) that may skew to one candidate or another.
  • Similarly, any systematic voter suppression would likely cause the polls to underpredict Trump. These voters are available to poll, but may not be able to cast a valid vote.
  • There has been little mention of third-party candidates in polling results. The Libertarian candidate is on the ballot in all 50 states. The Green Party candidate is on the ballot in 31 states. Other parties have candidates on the ballot in some states but not others. These candidates aren’t expected to garner a lot of votes, but in a close election even a few percentage points could matter to the results. I have seen national polls from reputable organizations where they weren’t included.
  • While there is little credible data supporting that there are “shy” Trump voters that are intentionally lying to pollsters, there still might be a social desirability bias that would undercount Trump’s support. That social desirability bias could be larger than it was in 2016, and it is still likely in the direction of under predicting Trump’s vote count.
  • Polls (and research surveys) tend to underrepresent rural areas. Folks in rural areas are less likely to be in online panels and to cooperate on surveys. Few pollsters take this into account. (I have never seen a corporate research client correcting for this, and it has been a pet peeve of mine for years.) This is a sample coverage issue that will likely undercount the Trump vote.
  • Sampling has continued to get harder. Cell phone penetration has continued to grow, online panel quality has fallen, and our best option (ABS sampling) is still far from random and so expensive it is beyond the reach of most polls.
  • “Herding” is a rarely discussed, but very real polling problem. Herding refers to pollsters who conduct a poll that doesn’t conform to what other polls are finding. These polls tend to get scrutinized and reweighted until they fit to expectations, or even worse, buried and never released. Think about it – if you are a respected polling organization that conducted a recent poll that showed Trump would win the popular vote, you’d review this poll intensely before releasing it and you might choose not to release it at all because it might put your firm’s reputation at risk to release a poll that looks different than the others. The only polls I have seen that appear to be out of range are ones from smaller organizations who are likely willing to run the risk of being viewed as predicting against the tide or who clearly have a political bias to them.

Once the dust settles, we will compose a post that analyzes how the 2020 polls did. For now, we feel there are a more credible reasons to believe the polls will be seen as predictive than to feel that we are on the edge of a polling mistake.  From a researcher’s standpoint, the biggest worry is that the polls will indeed be accurate, but won’t match the vote totals because of technicalities in vote counting and legal challenges. That would reflect unfairly on the polling and research industries.

“Margin of error” sort of explained (+/-5%)

It is now September of an election year. Get ready for a two-month deluge of polls and commentary on them. One thing you can count on is reporters and pundits misinterpreting the meaning behind “margin of error.” This post is meant to simplify the concept.

Margin of error refers to sampling error and is present on every poll or market research survey. It can be mathematically calculated. All polls seek to figure out what everybody thinks by asking a small sample of people. There is always some degree of error in this.

The formula for margin of error is fairly simple and depends mostly on two things: how many people are surveyed and their variability of response. The more people you interview, the lower (better) the margin of error. The more the people you interview give the same response (lower variability), the better the margin of error. If a poll interviews a lot of people and they all seem to be saying the same thing, the margin of error of the poll is low. If the poll interviews a small number of people and they disagree a lot, the margin of error is high.

Most reporters understand that a poll with a lot of respondents is better than one with fewer respondents. But most don’t understand the variability component.

There is another assumption used in the calculation for sampling error as well: the confidence level desired. Almost every pollster will use a 95% confidence level, so for this explanation we don’t have to worry too much about that.

What does it mean to be within the margin of error on a poll? It simply means that the two percentages being compared can be deemed different from one another with 95% confidence. Put another way, if the poll was repeated a zillion times, we’d expect that at least 19 out of 20 times the two numbers would be different.

If Biden is leading Trump in a poll by 8 points and the margin of error is 5 points, we can be confident he is really ahead because this lead is outside the margin of error. Not perfectly confident, but more than 95% confident.

Here is where reporters and pundits mess it up.  Say they are reporting on a poll with a 5-point margin of error and Biden is leading Trump by 4 points. Because this lead is within the margin of error, they will often call it a “statistical dead heat” or say something that implies that the race is tied.

Neither is true. The only way for a poll to have a statistical dead heat is for the exact same number of people to choose each candidate. In this example the race isn’t tied at all, we just have a less than 95% confidence that Biden is leading. In this example, we might be 90% sure that Biden is leading Trump. So, why would anyone call that a statistical dead heat? It would be way better to be reporting the level of confidence that we have that Biden is winning, or the p-value of the result. I have never seen a reporter do that, but some of the election prediction websites do.

Pollsters themselves will misinterpret the concept. They will deem their poll “accurate” as long as the election result is within the margin of error. In close elections this isn’t helpful, as what really matters is making a correct prediction of what will happen.

Most of the 2016 final polls were accurate if you define being accurate as coming within the margin of error. But, since almost all of them predicted the wrong winner, I don’t think we will see future textbooks holding 2016 out there as a zenith of polling accuracy.

Another mistake reporters (and researchers make) is not recognizing that the margin of error only refers to sampling error which is just one of many errors that can occur on a poll. The poor performance of the 2016 presidential polls really had nothing to do with sampling error at all.

I’ve always questioned why there is so much emphasis on sampling error for a couple of reasons. First, the calculation of sampling error assumes you are working with a random sample which in today’s polling world is almost never the case. Second, there are many other types of errors in survey research that are likely more relevant to a poll’s accuracy than sampling error. The focus on sampling error is driven largely because it is the easiest error to mathematically calculate. Margin of error is useful to consider, but needs to be put in context of all the other types of errors that can happen in a poll.


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